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UNDERSTANDING THE JURY WITH THE 
HELP OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Stephen Saltzburg* 
INSIDE THE JURY. By Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod and Nancy Pen-
nington. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1983. Pp. vii, 
277. $20. 
INTRODUCTION 
American courts place tremendous responsibility in the hands of 
juries. In civil cases, juries determine whether persons who claim 
some kind of injury are entitled to receive compensation from other 
persons. Juries who find that compensation is in order can fix the 
amount of compensation at a level so low that it represents only nomi-
nal damages1 or so high that the award plainly represents punishment 
for behavior regarded as totally unacceptable.2 
Juries in criminal cases decide whether a defendant is guilty or not 
guilty, and if guilty, the degree of guilt. In some cases, juries decide 
what sentence to impose upon a convicted defendant. The most dra-
matic illustration of this responsibility comes in capital cases, in which 
a jury usually decides, or at least recommends a decision to the trial 
judge, whether a defendant should live or die. 3 
In the course of reaching these results, juries in both civil and 
criminal cases are asked to do a number of different things. They must 
decide who did what to whom, when, how and often why. Unlike 
historians, who may well study a subject for years before arriving at a 
conclusion about past events and who typically feel free to disagree 
among themselves as to the accuracy of various reconstructions, jurors 
have a limited amount of time in which to make a decision, have ac-
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1967, Dickinson College; J.D. 1970, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. Professor Saltzburg is author of AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d 
ed. 1984). - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., Harris, Shockley Found Libeled, Receives $1 in Damages, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 
1984, at A2, col. 1 (Atlanta jury awards Nobel prize winner $1 damages in suit against newspa-
per and reporter for comparing his genetic theories to those of Nazi Germany in WW II). 
2. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-17 (Colo. 1984) (discussing the 
problem of "punitive overkill" resulting from multiple punitive damages awards in products lia-
bility cases). 
3. Although the Supreme Court has not required that juries decide the life-or-death question, 
and although it has upheld a judge-imposed death sentence following a jury recommendation of 
leniency, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984), every jurisdiction in the United States 
permitting capital punishment gives the jury the opportunity at least to make a recommendation 
as to whether it should be imposed. 
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cess to fewer facts than the historian, 4 hear evidence that supports the 
parties' views of past events rather than an independent, detached 
view, focus exclusively on the aspects of events to which the law at-
taches significance, and must endeavor to reach consensus amongst 
themselves on a reconstruction of the events at issue. 
To further complicate the task, jurors must attempt to understand 
the law as it is given to them by a trial judge. The law found in stat-
utes and decisions usually is written by lawyers for other lawyers. It is 
not easily explained to the uninitiated. And yet, after simply hearing 
the instructions delivered orally by the trial judge (and in some juris-
dictions after having an opportunity to read the instructions), jurors 
must master the law so that they can apply it to the historical recon-
struction upon which they settle. 
And while finding facts and learning and applying law, jurors are 
also expected to do a little "rough justice" - to make the law work 
fairly in a particular case. This may mean acquitting a technically 
guilty defendant because it is unjust to apply the law as written to the 
circumstances of a particular case. 5 In a civil case, the jury may re-
duce a damage award to reflect the uncertainty it may feel about liabil-
ity, even though the plaintiff has proved liability by a preponderance 
of the evidence, which is all that the law requires. 
In sum, we expect a lot from our juries, and it is not surprising 
therefore that from time to time we are inclined to wonder whether we 
ask too much. Can a group of people, most if not all of whom have no 
legal training, come together once in their lives, hear an explanation of 
legal terms for the first time, consider opposing presentations by 
trained advocates and arrive at a result that is approximately correct 
and just? Doubts have been raised in complex cases. 6 But in other 
cases our judicial system has assumed that juries can and will do all of 
the tasks assigned to them, and that they will perform well. 
For a considerable time, the assumption that juries truly did what 
was asked of them was based on anecdotal reports from lawyers, 
judges and persons who served on juries. But in 1966 Professors 
Kalven and Zeisel produced a study of jury behavior that was system-
atic and informative, and that led many observers to believe that the 
reigning assumption was supported by careful empirical observation.7 
4. This is attributable to various exclusionary rules that protect the process from "prejudi-
cial" influences, see, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of 
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time), or that serve to enforce constitutional or other legal 
rights, such as the exclusionary rule that suppresses evidence in some cases if it has been seized in 
violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5. Jurors are expected to do this on their own, since trial judges rarely tell juries that they 
may acquit a guilty defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). 
6. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Lit., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). 
7. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
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The jury, it appeared, had been tested and had passed the test. 
Since the 1966 study, the focus has shifted from questioning 
whether the jury can do what is asked of it to questioning whether 
changes in the rules governing the way in which a jury is selected or 
directed to perform its tasks improve, adversely affect, or have no sig-
nifi.cant impact upon jury decisionmaking. After the Supreme Court 
held, in Williams v. Florida, 8 that six-member juries were constitution-
ally permissible in criminal cases, a spate of studies sought to test the 
Court's reasoning.9 Numerous studies, this time of "death-qualified" 
juries, 10 also appeared in response to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 11 in which the Court found insufficient data to 
justify a conclusion that juries from which persons opposed to capital 
punishment were excluded were biased on the question of guilt or 
innocence. 
The most recent study prompted by such Supreme Court rulings is 
Inside the Jury, a collaborative effort by three social scientists which 
examines the effect that "decision rules" - rules governing the 
number of jurors that must agree before a verdict may be returned -
have on jury behavior. The study appeared a little more than a decade 
after the Supreme Court's decisions in Apodaca v. Oregon 12 and John-
son v. Louisiana, 13 which upheld state decision rules permitting juries 
in criminal cases to return verdicts supported by a minimum of ten of 
twelve jurors and nine of twelve jurors, respectively. 
Inside the Jury is a very important book to anyone who is inter-
ested in the way juries work. It is carefully done. The authors demon-
strate their concern for accuracy at each step of their analysis. They 
recognize the dangers in moving too quickly from data obtained in 
simulated trials to generalizations about the way real jurors perform. 
To study a relatively small number of juries (sixty-nine in all), the 
authors spent a great deal of time and invested substantial amounts of 
research money. The investment was well worth it, for Inside the Jury 
is the most valuable source of information about how juries go about 
their decision-making tasks that has been produced. It will be cited in 
any future litigation or legislative debate concerning the merits of 
unanimous and nonunanimous juries. But Inside the Jury is much 
more than a study of rules of decision and their effects upon juries. It 
is rich in information relevant to a host of questions that lawyers, 
8. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
9. See, e.g., Beiser & Varrin, Six-member Juries in the Federal Courts, 58 JUDICATURE 425 
(1975); Mills, Six-member and Twelve-member Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 671 (1973). 
10. See, e.g., the studies cited and analyzed in Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. 
Ark. 1983) affd., No. 83-2113, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan. 30, 1985). 
11. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
12. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
13. 406 U.S. 356 (1972). 
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judges and legislators continually ask as they endeavor to improve the 
quality of justice in America. 
As good as Inside the Jury is, it is not perfect. In fact, the authors 
may believe that in some instances they have demonstrated more than 
they really have. There are some methodological problems that they 
miss, and this review will examine the most important of these. But 
nothing that will be said here is meant to depreciate the significance of 
the research reported in Inside the Jury. That research and the data 
that the authors have collected will enrich the discussion of juries and 
the trial process for the foreseeable future. Anyone would be proud to 
have made such a contribution. 
I. THE SIMULATED TRIAL METHQD 
The authors of Inside the Jury began by deciding that a study of 
mock jurors dealing with a simulated case afforded a greater opportu-
nity for gathering data than a study of jurors sitting in real cases "be-
cause of laws prohibiting the direct scrutiny of actual juries and 
because of the important advantages of scientific experimental meth-
ods" (for example, the capacity to tape a single trial and to show it to 
all juries in order to control for the quality of the performance by 
lawyers, witnesses and the trial judge) (p. 37). Thus, the research for 
Inside the Jury was done by recruiting mock jurors from the actual 
jury pools utilized in the superior courts of three counties in Massa-
chusetts. At the beginning of each one-month sitting, a judge and one 
of the researchers explained the study to the jury pool and passed out 
a printed volunteer form to collect the names of potential mock jurors. 
The volunteer rate ranged between seventy-five and eighty-five percent 
(p. 45). 
When the time for a mock trial came, the chief jury pool officer for 
each court would summon a· panel of sixteen to twenty volunteers who 
submitted to an informal voir dire by a researcher. The voir dire 
sought to exclude from the mock juries law e_nforcement agents or 
members of their immediate families and recent victims of violent 
crime. Also excluded were prospective jurors who had heard about 
the experimental procedure or the results of any of the experimental 
work from other jurors, and those jurors who had been excused from 
jury duty for the fqllowing day. Once twelve jurors and an alternate 
were selected, the remaining jurors were excused and asked to return 
to the general jury pool to participate. in the study at a later time (pp. 
45-46). 
The twelve jurors and the alternate watched a taped trial, which is 
described in the next section of this review. The researcher told them 
that the trial was a reenactment of a real case and that it included all 
of the evidence, details, and testimony that were important in the real 
case. The researcher also told them that after they watched the trial, 
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they would be observed as they deliberated to a verdict. The experi-
menter selected a jury foreman, usually picking someone who had pre-
viously served in that role. Although the mock juries contained more 
women 14 and more married jurors than the actual jury pool, 15 the 
composition of the mock juries appears in most other respects to have 
been very similar to the composition of the overall jury pool. 16 
After the jury watched the videotaped trial, it received instructions 
from the judge.17 One-third of the juries were told that their verdict 
had to be unanimous, another third were told that at least ten of the 
jurors had to agree in order to return a verdict, and the final third 
were told that agreement by at least eight of the jurors was required 
for a verdict. 18 Thus, each jury saw the same trial and received identi-
cal instructions, except for the part concerning the agreement that was 
required for the jury to return a verdict (pp. 50-51). 
Before beginning deliberations, each juror filled out an individual 
questionnaire indicating the verdict that he or she would choose if a 
vote were then taken, how certain the choice was, and the verdict that 
would be chosen as a second choice (p. 51). Thereafter, the experi-
menter took the juries to a deliberation room that contained ballot 
pads and pencils for each juror, photographs of the exhibits and of the 
street diagram used during the trial, and a small television camera that 
recorded the deliberations. The experimenter reminded the jurors of 
their decision rule and told them that they were provided ballots that 
they could use for a secret ballot if they wished, but that they were not 
obliged to vote in any particular way. Jurors also were told that they 
would be given a lunch break and excused at the end of the day if their 
deliberations had not concluded, but that they would have to return to 
complete deliberations. The experimenter informed the jurors that 
they could ask for further instructions and that portions of the judge's 
charge could be replayed on a television monitor; that if their foreman 
declared the jury deadlocked, a videotaped charge from the judge ask-
ing them to try once more to reach a verdict would be given; and that 
14. The mock jury pool contained 44% women, while the actual jury pool contained only 
34% women. P. 46. 
15. Sixty-nine percent of the mock jurors were married, compared to 58% of the overall jury 
pool. P. 46. 
16. For example, the mock juries had 44% white-collar workers as compared to 46% for the 
overall pool; 1 % students as compared to 2%; 5% retired persons as compared to 6%; and 4% 
unemployed persons as compared to 3%. The most significant difference in occupational catego-
ries was that the mock juries had 13% blue-collar workers while the overall jury pool had 23%. 
P. 46. 
17. Although the study does not make it absolutely clear that the instructions were also 
taped, it is a fair assumption (and one would hope) that they were, since any differences in the 
way the judge instructed each jury could have affected the outcome of the experiment. The 
authors do indicate that the judge's "dynamite" charge to juries having difficulty reaching a 
verdict was videotaped. P. 51. 
18. Juries were assigned to decision rules randomly so that each experimenter had an equal 
number of juries in each decision rule during the course of the study. P. 51. 
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the jury would be declared a hung jury if it could not agree during its 
second round of deliberations (p. 51). 
Following deliberations, the jurors were given a postdeliberation 
questionnaire, to be completed individually and without discussion. 
This questionnaire probed the jurors' reactions to the videotaped trial, 
how they reacted to other jurors, previous jury service and personal 
background, ability to remember information from the trial and the 
instructions, and jurors' opinions about nine key issues in the trial. At 
the end of this postdeliberation procedure, the experimenter debriefed 
the jurors and explained the purpose of the study (pp. 52-53). 
II. THE VIDEOTAPED TRIAL 
Because all of the data gathered by the authors was based on the 
mock jurors' reaction to one trial, the evidence comprising that trial is 
extremely important. The data must be analyzed in light of what the 
juries observed. 
The researchers chose a murder trial that they regarded, with the 
advice and counsel of legal experts, as a typical, serious felony case 
that was sufficiently complex to afford a variety of verdict preferences. 
They began with a complete transcript of an actual trial and reenacted 
the trial using university faculty, professional actors, a police officer, a 
sitting superior court judge, and two attorneys. They gave each actor 
a summary of the case highlighting his or her testimony. The judge 
and attorneys received unabridged copies of the instructions given in 
the real case, selections of relevant testimony, and the actual opening 
statements and closing arguments made in the case. The participants 
in the reenactment endeavored to follow closely the original case while 
acting in the way they usually would in a courtroom (p. 47). 
The tape began with the clerk's reading of an indictment charging 
the defendant, Frank Johnson, with the murder of Alan Caldwell on 
the night of May 9, 1976. Next, the prosecutor made an opening state-
ment. Defense counsel did not follow with an opening statement, 
waiting instead until the beginning of the defense case to open to the 
jury.19 The prosecutor called four witnesses. 
A police officer testified as follows: While patrolling his beat, he 
heard a loud exchange of words between two men standing in front of 
Gleason's Grill. He moved closer, saw the victim strike the defendant, 
and saw the defendant draw a knife and stab downward in an over-
head thrust into the victim's chest. The-officer disarmed the defendant, 
requested help over a callbox telephone, and waited at the Grill until 
another officer came and took the defendant away and an ambulance 
removed the body of the victim (p. 47). 
19. Whether this was a tactical decision or one required by a local rule or a particular judge's 
preference is not revealed. 
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On cross-examination, the officer stated that the defendant had be-
haved as a "quiet, law-abiding citizen" over the several years the of-
ficer had known him. Defense counsel's attempt to obtain the officer's 
comment on the victim's reputation for violence was cut off by an ob-
jection from the prosecutor. The officer was pressed further about de-
tails of what he had observed (pp. 47-48). 
The second witness, the police officer who took the defendant to 
the station house, testified on direct examination that the defendant 
had stated that the victim pulled a razor on him, but the judge struck 
the testimony on the ground that it was illegally obtained.20 On cross-
examination, the witness stated that the defendant had not been in 
trouble before during the years the witness had known him (p. 48). 
A medical examiner was the third witness. He testified about the 
cause of death and the condition of the body. Most importantly, he 
stated that a closed straight razor was found in the left rear pants 
pocket of the deceased, that the deceased had a blood alcohol level of 
0.32% and, on cross-examination, that considerable force would have 
been required to cause the deceased's wounds, although he could not 
be sure whether the knife was thrust downward or upward into the 
deceased's body (p. 48). 
Finally, the owner-bartender at the Grill testified as follows: The 
deceased and the defendant had quarreled at the Grill on the after-
noon of the killing. The quarrel ended when the deceased threatened 
the defendant with a straight razor. Later, the defendant and a friend 
returned to the Grill. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and the de-
ceased stepped outside together. The bartender could not see what 
happened because a sign blocked his view (p. 48). The judge did not 
permit the bartender to testify concerning the defendant's reputation 
for peacefulness, the prosecutor having successfully objected to this 
testimony (p. 48). 
The prosecution rested on the foregoing testimony, and the defense 
began with an opening statement urging that the killing had been an 
act of self-defense. The defense called three witnesses. 
First, the friend who had returned to the Grill with the defendant 
testified that the defendant had attempted to avoid an encounter with 
the deceased, that the deceased entered the bar after their arrival, and 
that the deceased initiated the conversation that led to the fight 
outside. Furthermore, the witness claimed that he saw the fight and 
that the deceased struck the first blow and drew a straight razor. He 
added that the defendant often carried his knife to use when fishing. 
The witness' attempt to describe the deceased's reputation for violence 
was cut off when the prosecution objected. On cross-examination, the 
20. It violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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prosecutor established that it would have been difficult for the witness 
to have seen so much through a narrow barroom door (pp. 48-49). 
A barmaid from the Grill confirmed the bartender's account of the 
events and testified that a car parked in the street outside the bar 
would have obstructed the beat officer's (the first government witness') 
view of the fight. She also was barred from describing the deceased's 
violent reputation when the judge sustained the prosecution's objec-
tions to such testimony (p. 49). 
The third witness was the defendant himself. He testified that he 
and the deceased had quarreled on the afternoon of the killing and 
that the deceased had pulled a straight razor on him. He said he left 
the bar to avoid trouble and spent the time before he returned to the 
Grill with his wife and children. He said that his friend came by, and 
the two of them went to the Grill at approxima~ely nine p.m. The 
deceased entered the bar and asked him to step outside for a conversa-
tion. The defendant claimed that the deceased became hostile, 
threatened to kill him, punched him in the face, and drew a straight 
razor as the defendant stumbled. The defendant added that he drew 
his knife for protection and the deceased ran into it (p. 49). 
The trial judge informed the jury that it could consider three de-
grees of homicide. He defined first degree murder as "a deliberately 
premeditated killing with malice aforethought," second degree murder 
as "a killing with malice but without premeditation," and manslaugh-
ter as "a killing without malice, as when a person, in the heat of pas-
sion or in sudden combat, inflicts a fatal wound upon another." The 
judge also explained that self-defense is established when "there is a 
reasonable expectation of suffering great bodily harm, all reasonable 
means of avoiding or escaping from the confrontation once it is appar-
ent have been exhausted, and the means of defense is reasonable given 
the threat" (p. 50). 21 
III. THE DELIBERATIONS 
The following table indicates both the predeliberation preferences 
of the jurors and the postdeliberation verdicts (p. 60): 
21. It is impossible to tell from the authors' account whether the judge, in describing self-
defense, placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant or whether the burden remained on 
the prosecution. 
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Pre- and postdeliberation verdicts and deliberation times. 
Decision rule 
Jury verdicts 12/12 10/12 8/12 
Postdeliberation 
First degree murder 0 5 1 
Second degree murder 13 13 13 
Manslaughter 7 5 8 
Not guilty 0 0 0 
Hung 3 0 1 
Predeliberation preferences 
First degree murder 21% 28% 17% 
Second degree murder 24% 23% 26% 
Manslaughter 30% 29% 33% 
Not guilty 12% 05% 11% 
Undecided 13% 15% 13% 
Holdout jurors at end of deliberation 
in verdict-rendering juries 0.00 1.61 2.89 
(averaged) 
Deliberation time 138 103 75 F(2,63) = 6.56 
(averaged in minutes)a p < .003 
MSc = 3096 
There are several aspects of the table that are especially interesting. 
In all three groups of jurors, the modal verdict is second degree mur-
der. Thirteen of twenty-three juries in each group returned this ver-
dict. No jury returned a not guilty verdict. The only obvious 
difference between the unanimous and nonunanimous verdict juries is 
that only nonunanimous juries returned verdicts of first degree mur-
der. 22 It is also significant that only approximately one-quarter of the 
jurors in each group began deliberations with a second degree murder 
verdict as their first choice. Thus, there can be no doubt that group 
deliberations produced results that differed from individual analyses. 
While the table reproduced above affords a summary of the results 
of deliberations, the authors of Inside the Jury offer more than this. In 
fact, the heart of their research revolves around an observational cod-
ing scheme that measured the participation rates of jurors, their voting 
patterns, the accuracy of their application of the law, the amount of 
reliance upon the evidence presented, and the accuracy of statements 
concerning the evidence. It is impossible, of course, for the reader to 
do more than consider the authors' representations concerning their 
efforts to assure consistent and fair measurement of juror behavior, but 
these representations do suggest an overriding concern for accuracy 
and fairness. Two coders, a male and a female college graduate each 
in their early twenties, coded all of the jury tapes. In addition, one of 
these coders coded samples of the deliberations twice, separated by an 
22. Hereafter, the word "nonunanimous" and the term "majority-rule jury" will be used 
interchangeably. 
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interval of several months. These same samples were coded by other 
coders who worked independently. It appears from all this that the 
coding scheme produced consistency and enabled the researchers to 
make fair comparisons among the various jurors and juries.23 
The conclusions drawn from the coding and study of actual juror 
performance during deliberations reveal differences that might well be 
regarded as more significant than the differences in overall results 
among the various groups set forth in the table above. At one point, 
the authors summarize some of the more salient findings as follows: 
[B]ehavior in unanimous rule juries contrasts with typical behavior in 
majority rule juries in six respects: deliberation time (majority rule juries 
take less time to render verdicts), small faction participation (members 
of small factions are less likely to speak under majority rules), faction 
growth rates (large factions attract members more rapidly under major-
ity rules), holdouts Gurors are more apt to be holdouts at the end of 
deliberation under majority rules), time of voting (majority rule juries 
tend to vote sooner), and deliberation style (majority rule juries are 
slightly likelier to adopt a verdict-driven deliberation style in contrast to 
the evidence-driven style). 
. . . Verdict driven juries vote early and organize discussion in an 
adversarial manner around verdict-favoring factions, as opposed to evi-
dence-driven juries which defer voting and start with a relatively united 
discussion of evidence, turning to verdict categories later in deliberation. 
[Pp. 173-74.] 
Having made these findings, the authors of Inside the Jury apparently 
conclude that they have demonstrated the superiority of the unani-
mous jury over nonunanimous juries.24 Other social scientists appear 
to have accepted these conclusions. Indeed, two reviewers have been 
so bold as to state that Inside the Jury establishes that the Supreme 
Court was wrong in upholding nonunanimous juries in Oregon and 
Louisiana. 25 
The authors of Inside the Jury bolster the case for unanimous ju-
ries by noting that only nonunanimous juries returned verdicts of first 
degree murder, a verdict that they find to be clearly excessive on the 
facts of the case shown to the juries (p. 62). Although the random 
allocation of jurors happened to produce a distribution that had a 
much larger percentage of jurors whose predeliberation assessment 
was first degree murder in the juries operating under a ten-person ma-
jority requirement than in the other two categories, the authors main-
tain that this does not explain why only nonunanimous juries returned 
first degree murder convictions. Five juries in the unanimous decision 
group had either four, five or six members " -,ose initial verdict prefer-
23. See pp. 53-58. 
24. See pp. 227-33. 
25. Loftus & Greene, Twelve Angry People: The Collective Mind of the Jury, 84 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1425, 1429 (1984). 
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ence was first degree murder, but none of these juries returned a ver-
dict of first degree murder. Ten juries in the majority of ten decision 
rule group had this many jurors begin with first degree murder votes, 
and four of these juries actually convicted the defendant of first degree 
murder. Only one jury in the majority of eight groups had such a 
large number of members with an initial preference for first degree 
murder, and it did not convict on this charge (p. 61). 
IV. WHAT THE STUDY PROVES 
Before reading Inside the Jury, I thought it might be useful to re-
cord the hypotheses that I expected to be proved correct by a study of 
unanimous and nonunanimous juries. These hypotheses are not origi-
nal, but find their support in other studies and descriptions of jury 
behavior. 
My hypotheses were these: (1) Unanimous juries are likely to de-
liberate longer than nonunanimous juries, since everyone on the unani-
mous jury must finally agree upon a verdict, while dissenters on 
majority-rule juries never need be convinced of the correctness of the 
majority view. (2) Unanimous jurors who finally commit themselves 
to a group verdict are less likely to be critical of the final verdict than 
nonunanimous jurors. Since people rarely like to confess their own 
mistakes, unanimous jurors will tend to support their verdicts, while 
dissenters on nonunanimous juries will disagree with the verdict, and 
the fact that they disagree might cause some discomfiture for the ma-
jority jurors (although the majority in some cases might actually be-
come more confident after hearing and rejecting the arguments of the 
dissenters). (3) Unanimous juries are more likely to hang than 
nonunanimous juries, since it is always harder to get twelve votes than 
to get eight or ten. ( 4) Except perhaps in "majority of eight" juries, 
which might begin with the necessary majority or a group close to the 
majority number and thus have very brief deliberations, the factual 
accuracy of majority-rule and unanimous juries should be similar. 
Majority-rule juries would perhaps benefit from an adversarial devel-
opment of facts during· deliberations, while unanimous juries might 
benefit from the need to collect the facts necessary to satisfy everyone. 
(5) Unanimous juries might actually compromise in order to reach a 
consensus in circumstances in which majority-rule juries would not 
compromise and would end instead with a majority group and a dis-
senting group. 
For the most part these hypotheses proved to be correct. But I 
would not have predicted that "majority of ten" juries would produce 
less accurate verdicts than unanimous juries, as the study suggests. I 
doubt that I would have predicted that jurors in nonunanimous juries 
would consider their deliberations to have been less careful and less 
serious than jurors on unanimous juries (p. 79). 
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Certainly, there is cause for concern if majority-rule juries are less 
careful, less serious and more likely to err than their unanimous coun-
terparts. There is also cause for concern if it is true that majority-rule 
juries are likely to hurry toward judgment once they approach the 
number needed for a verdict while unanimous juries are likely to exer-
cise far more care throughout deliberations, and, as the study suggests, 
even change verdicts with some frequency in the final stages of deliber-
ations (p. 102). Thus, the issue is whether the study demonstrates 
these occurrences in a convincing enough fashion to warrant concern. 
Others may be quicker to embrace the conclusions which the au-
thors suggest than I, and they may be _correct to do so. But I believe 
that what the authors identify as the most serious problems with 
nonunanimous juries remain speculative and unproved. The study is 
superb in forcing the potential problems to the surface, and it need not 
provide final answers to take its place among the best social science 
works on the legal system. In my view it earns its place, but it does not 
provide final answers to the questions that it raises concerning major-
ity-rule juries. 
One reason for my doubts is that even a study so carefully done as 
this one is bound to have methodological problems. There are, for 
example, two principal problems with the authors' approach to testing 
the degree and quality of participation by majority and minority jurors 
in the deliberations of nonunanimous juries. First, it appears that the 
jurors selected for the mock juries almost all had prior experience, and 
the authors even selected foremen who had previously served in this 
position. To the extent that jurors with prior service knew that unani-
mous verdicts are the American norm, they also knew that when they 
were placed on a majority-rule jury they were asked to depart from the 
norm. Is it any wonder that they would have less confidence in ver-
dicts rendered according to a procedure that they knew was not the 
one usually employed in the courts where they had served? 
Second, the jurors were not told until debriefing why they were 
asked to operate on a majority-rule basis. If, in fact, jurors understood 
that unanimity was the norm and that they were in an experiment, 
they might well have concluded that as soon as they had a majority 
confident enough to return a verdict they should do so. In their eyes, 
this might have been what the researchers expected of them. 
We would have had a real test of whether minority jurors are likely 
to have their views fairly considered by a majority had the jurors been 
given an instruction like the following:26 
To return a verdict, at least (ten, eight) of you must agree with that 
verdict. This does not mean that as soon as you have (ten, eight) votes 
26. Another defect is that the study apparently assumes that in majority-rule jurisdictions 
lawyers would not comment to the jury on the need for full participation and the importance of 
allowing minority voices to be heard. 
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you should stop deliberating. It is vital that all of you share your views 
with one another and that those of you in the majority at any point care-
fully consider the views of those of you in the minority, and that those in 
the minority at any point carefully consider the views of those in the 
majority. If, after carefully considering all views and deliberating so that 
everyone has been heard, you reach a point at which you believe that 
further deliberations will not affect the verdict, you may return a verdict 
supported by (ten, eight) votes. 
It is possible that the dissenting Supreme Court justices in Johnson v. 
Louisiana and Apodaca v. Oregon were correct in asserting that major-
ity jurors will dominate discussion and that once a majority is reached, 
minority views will be ignored. Inside the Jury cannot confirm or rebut 
their assertion, however, since it did not test it, at least not in a way 
that permits any firm conclusion to be drawn. 
There are also major problems with the authors' suggestions that 
the juries which returned first degree murder verdicts were plainly 
wrong. It is apparent that the authors too readily accepted the claims 
of experts whom they consulted that second degree murder was the 
"correct" verdict. The real case from which the videotape was drawn 
did produce a second degree murder conviction, and it appears that 
the actors and researchers knew this. Thus, it is predictable that they 
would have begun with a bias toward a second degree murder verdict. 
It is also predictable that the performers on the videotape, especially 
the prosecutor and the defense attorney, would have been affected by 
their knowledge that second degree murder was assumed to be the 
correct result. 
Although a reader of the book does not see the tape, he must be 
able to take the description of it as accurate, or he will be at a loss to 
evaluate the study. The description of the witnesses' testimony estab-
lishes to my satisfaction that a reasonable jury could have arrived at 
any verdict from first degree murder to not guilty. The reasoning a 
jury would use to reach each verdict is described below. 
First degree murder. The defendant knew that the deceased car-
ried a razor, and he had quarreled with the deceased the very after-
noon of the killing. Yet, the defendant armed himself with a knife and 
returned to the Grill. He went outside with the deceased, apparently 
without hesitation. He knew, of course, when he did so that he had 
his knife with him. Although the deceased might have struck the de-
fendant, a fight is precisely what the defendant expected, and he delib-
erately stabbed the deceased to death with great force. It really does 
not matter what the patrolling officer saw, since there is no dispute 
that the killing was executed with great force. Moreover, it is incon-
ceivable that the deceased pulled his razor from his pocket, since it 
was found unopened in his pocket by the medical examiner. The alco-
hol level of the deceased suggests that he probably had trouble even 
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carrying himself very well, let alone in making a dangerous assault 
upon the defendant. This is premeditated murder. 
Second degree murder. The defendant might have known when he 
returned to the Grill that there would be trouble, but he did enter 
when the deceased was not present. Although the defendant armed 
himself, he did so for protection. He went outside with the deceased 
to avoid appearing to back down a second time. When the deceased 
struck the defendant, the defendant killed him. He acted with malice, 
but he had not planned to kill the deceased. 
Manslaughter. Although the defendant had a knife with him, he 
did not want any trouble. He went with his friend to the Grill and did 
not begin any quarrel. Rather, he stepped outside with the deceased to 
resolve matters that had arisen in the afternoon. When the deceased 
struck the defendant in the face, as he plainly did, the defendant, 
knowing that the deceased had previously pulled a razor on him, acted 
in the heat of passion and in fear and killed the deceased. 
Not guilty. The defendant had every right to go to his neighbor-
hood bar where it seems he regularly spent time. He had not caused 
any problem in the afternoon, yet he knew that the deceased had pul-
led a razor on him. Although the defendant did not want to appear to 
abandon his bar out of fear, he also did not want to risk harm from the 
deceased. He armed himself in order to defend himself if it became 
necessary to do so. When the defendant went outside with the de-
ceased, he hoped that the two of them could resolve the difficulty that 
had arisen during the afternoon. When the deceased struck him, the 
defendant reasonably feared for his life and might have thought that 
any movement of the deceased's hands and arms involved the use of a 
razor, since only that afternoon he had seen the razor. Although it 
appears that the defendant was incorrect about the razor, he reason-
ably feared for his life and he acted reasonably, especially since it was 
night and he could not see well. 
The authors and their experts might well have considered second 
degree murder to be the correct result because of the result of the real 
trial and also because in real life that verdict is expected in many such 
cases. But the methodological problem is that in real life second de-
gree murder verdicts may commonly be returned precisely because ju-
ries must be unanimous, and therefore they tend to compromise. This 
is not the same as saying that a verdict of second degree murder is a 
correct verdict. Because of the influence of the knowledge of the real 
trial's results - a result which because of long experience with unani-
mous juries was thought to be "correct" - the participants in the 
mock trial might have sent subtle messages that increased the likeli-
hood that a second degree murder verdict would be returned. 
There is no way of knowing what is "correct" in either the real 
trial or the mock trial. Reasonable people could reach different results 
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and, in my judgment, could have returned any of the four available 
verdicts. It may be that the "majority of ten" juries compromised less 
often than the unanimous juries, but this is not a sign of inaccuracy or 
undue harshness. It is what one might have expected from 
nonunanimous juries. It is especially interesting to note that when ju-
rors were asked postdeliberation questions about their confidence in 
the verdicts, the level of confidence among "majority of ten" juries was 
highest. Somewhat surprisingly, the confidence level was higher, not 
only among those voting with the majority, but also among dissenting 
jurors on "majority of ten" juries than the confidence level among the 
jurors on unanimous juries (p. 77).27 The "majority often" jurors who 
voted with the majority also expressed greater agreement with the ver-
dict than the jurors on unanimous juries (p. 77). This suggests that the 
dialogue between majority and dissenting jurors on majority rule juries 
may produce a greater sense of confidence among the majority as to 
the correctness of their result than a unanimous jury produces. 
It should be apparent, then, that Inside the Jury cannot tell us 
whether unanimous juries are more accurate than majority-rule juries 
or whether unanimous juries compromise to an undesirable extent. It 
cannot demonstrate whether the confidence of the majority on major-
ity-rule juries in their verdicts is justified or is the product of insuffi-
cient attention to the minority's arguments. Nor can it tell us whether 
majority-rule juries are prone to err as a result of reaching decisions 
too quickly. Although it is not a source of ready answers, Inside the 
Jury does serve to remind us that these are important things to think 
about, to worry over, and to study. And while Inside the Jury does 
not demonstrate whether the majority or the dissenters on the 
Supreme Court were correct in upholding nonunanimous juries, it 
does demonstrate that the justices asked the right questions.28 
27. Holdout jurors on unanimous juries obviously produced hungjuries, which made it diffi• 
cult for the authors to say much about how the confidence levels for majority and holdout jurors 
on hung juries ought to be assessed. See pp. 78-82. 
28. My own view is that even if it were proved that majority-rule juries are as accurate as 
unanimous juries and less likely to compromise, majority-rule juries offend the basic notion that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in order to convince the public that it should have 
confidence in verdicts. When one, two, three or four jurors are willing to proclaim publicly that 
the defendant is not guilty of the charge that a majority upholds, public confidence in the accu-
racy of verdicts diminishes. It is true that hung juries do not require entry of judgments of 
acquittal, and this means that the government's failure to prove to each juror the first time 
around that the defendant is guilty as charged is not an absolute bar to conviction. But I believe 
that the public understands that group dynamics are such that hung juries may result more from 
breakdowns in juror communication than from defects in evidence. 
A hung jury means that a jury has been permitted to end deliberations without being com-
pelled to return a verdict. No one can be certain that the jury might not have been unanimous if 
it had taken all the time required to reach unanimity. At some point, fears of exhaustion justify 
dismissing the jury. A nonunanimous verdict, on the other hand, is an announcement that some 
jurors' reasonable doubts are to be disregarded once and for all. Whether this analysis supports a 
constitutional rule barring majority-rule juries is more difficult to answer than whether it argues 
for legislatures to retain unanimous juries as a matter of choice. 
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V. LESSONS OF THE STUDY 
There is much to learn from Inside the Jury, and I attempt here to 
point out only a few of the lessons that might be learned. One lesson, 
hardly new but confirmed by the study, is that jurors endeavor to fol-
low the judge's instructions, but often have great difficulty in doing so. 
Inside the Jury establishes that juries make a considerable number of 
mistakes of law (pp. 80-81). There is a need for comprehensible jury 
instructions if jurors are to do a better job in applying the law as it is 
written to the facts of particular cases. 29 
Another lesson, of particular importance to trial lawyers, is that 
juries often use a story model to analyze a case. The stories that jurors 
tell to make facts fit together is related to the verdicts jurors choose (p. 
23). Juries that are evidence-driven tend to focus on arriving at a 
group story, whereas verdict-driven juries tend to develop individual 
juror stories and push toward votes on those theories early. Either 
type of jury ought to be affected by the skill with which a lawyer can 
pull together the disparate facts of a case and weave for the jury a 
script that the jury members will adopt as their vehicle for assessing 
the evidence or thinking about verdicts. Opening statements that put 
forth attractive stories which fit the evidence to be presented and 
which are followed by consistent closing arguments are of critical im-
portance. One reason why the juries in the study may have been prone 
to convict rather than to acquit might be the failure of defense counsel 
to offer the defense story immediately. This is speculation, of course, 
but it is something that trial advocates will want to think about. 
A third lesson to be gleaned from Inside the Jury is that scientific 
jury selection is unlikely to make much of a difference in the outcome 
of the typical case. The researchers examined most of the jurors by 
questionnaires focusing on age, gender, occupation, residence, educa-
tion, political party, ideology, marital status, income, race, number of 
previous cases heard as a juror, and number of criminal cases previ-
ously heard as a juror. The only significant differences among the 
ways jurors voted that might be explained by background characteris-
tics were that unemployed and retired jurors were somewhat more de-
fense-oriented than working people, women tended to be more 
defense-oriented than men, and jurors with more jury experience 
tended to be more prosecution-oriented than beginning jurors (pp. 
128-33). On the whole, however, the relationships between voting pat-
terns and juror characteristics were weak. 
A smaller number of jurors answered questions concerning years 
of employment, spouse's occupation, spouse's years of employment, 
years of residence at their current address, number of children, news-
29. As discussed below, a defendant deciding whether to go to trial or plea bargain might 
well want to know that juries err on the law in a disturbing number of instances. 
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paper most often read and frequency of newspaper reading, ethnic ori-
gin and degree of ethnic identity, and perceptions of the defendant and 
the victim. Several of these factors did display some, if only modest, 
predictive value: residence in a wealthy suburb, attitude toward pun-
ishing someone who causes another's death, and newspaper most fre-
quently read (p. 129). 
The authors conclude that it is difficult to predict who will be a 
holdout juror, but less difficult to predict who will be persuasive and 
who will participate actively in jury discussions. Those jurors who 
participated more also tended to be more persuasive to other jurors. 
Educated jurors tended to participate more frequently and to remem-
ber more than other jurors. High status occupation jurors, who also 
frequently were highly educated, also performed actively and 
remembered more than most jurors. Men spoke more than women, 
but this might have been explained by the generally higher educational 
and occupational levels found among the male jurors. The oldest and 
youngest jurors tended to participate less than others. Prior jury ser-
vice did not necessarily make jurors more likely to participate. Jury 
foremen were likely to participate more than average jurors. It is a 
little surprising, but open-mindedness was associated with speaking 
more rather than less (pp. 135-47). 
In sum, the results of comparing background characteristics to 
voting patterns indicate that it is extraordinarily difficult to predict 
how jurors will vote on the basis of characteristics that lawyers typi-
cally consider in deciding whom to strike and whom to pass during 
jury selection. The authors conclude, however, that "the jurors' world 
knowledge concerning events and individuals involved in the facts of 
the case does affect their verdict decisions" (p. 149). 
These findings confirm a view that I have expressed elsewhere, 30 
which is that lawyers who focus on a single characteristic - for exam-
ple, race or sex - in exercising peremptory challenges are probably 
making a mistake. No single characteristic is likely to be a very accu-
rate predictor in all cases. It also should make attacks on the consis-
tent use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a single 
group harder to win,31 since the study indicates that the views of indi-
viduals do not differ appreciably as a result of their race, sex, ethnicity 
or background characteristics (and therefore the requisite prejudice 
may not be shown). 
Inside the Jury gives us reason to be concerned about something 
that is too often overlooked when juries are selected, namely, that 
some jurors are likely to be especially persuasive in a group. Had I the 
power to roll back the clock and to change one part of the study, I 
30. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality 
and Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1982). 
31. See generally, s. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 889-96 (2d ed. 1984). 
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would not have excused from the juries law enforcement officers, their 
families, and recent victims of violent cime. Had these prospective 
jurors been included, we could have learned whether they have 
stronger feelings about aspects of the criminal justice system than 
other jurors, whether they are more likely than other jurors to voice 
their feelings, and whether they tend to be more or less persuasive 
than other jurors. 
I have been convinced for some time that one key to fair jury trials 
is to assure that jurors who are biased for or against one side are ex-
cused. 32 This seems to lie at the core of the sixth amendment guaran-
tee of "an impartial jury."33 The Supreme Court has told us that 
jurors who come to a case knowing about one of the parties, even a 
criminal defendant, can be trusted to put aside extrajudicial knowl-
edge and to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in 
court.34 Just last term the Court overturned a court of appeals' deci-
sion holding that a murder defendant did not receive a fair jury trial 
when the community feeling was so overwhelmingly against him that 
prejudice seeped into the jury box. 35 This confidence in the ability of 
"partial" jurors to act impartially is troubling. Jurors who confess to 
being predisposed are permitted, if not coerced by the trial judge, to 
state that they will be fair and thus to avoid challenges to cause. Now 
that Inside the Jury establishes that a juror's world view and feelings 
about the people involved in a case may be more significant than the 
background experiences and characteristics that a juror brings into the 
box with him, courts may be convinced that greater attention must be 
paid to the problem of juror bias. 
Inside the Jury should also make courts pause before assuming that 
various errors in the impanelment of jurors are harmless. In another 
decision rendered last term, Hobby v. United States, 36 the Supreme 
Court asserted its faith in the proposition that any discrimination in 
the selection of jury foremen and deputy foremen in the federal sys-
tem, as opposed to some state systems, 37 was harmless because their 
role was ministerial only. But according to Inside the Jury, foremen 
tend to have special influence in deliberations. Hence the very title of 
"foreman" may give· one juror unique power to influence others. In 
the future, it would be interesting to see other studies examine whether 
the foreman's influence varies depending on the way the person is se-
lected for the job - e.g., by the trial judge, by the seat number in 
32. Whether this is accomplished by expanding the scope of challenges for cause or by more 
careful voir dire and use of peremptory challenges is less important than that it is accomplished in 
some way. 
33. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
34. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). 
35. Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984). 
36. 104 s. Ct. 3093 (1984). 
37. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
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which he or she is seated, by random selection, or by vote of the jurors 
at the start of deliberations. 
There are two other lessons to be learned from Inside the Jury, 
although these have little to do with matters that the authors under-
took to study. One has to do with the relationship of trials to plea 
bargaining, and the other with the effect of errors of law on jury 
verdicts. 
As noted at the very beginning of this review, American courts ask 
juries to do several tasks, most of which are difficult. Inside the Jury 
demonstrates, without intending to do so, that a jury called upon to 
assess the mental state and intent of a defendant often must be at sea 
during deliberations. I have explained why any of the four available 
verdicts would have been appropriate in the taped trial shown to the 
jurors. Although most of the juries returned second degree murder 
verdicts, there is no reason to believe that this verdict is more correct 
than other verdicts. Nearly half the juries did not return this verdict. 
This means that even with the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt as a protection, no criminal defendant can be guaranteed a 
"right" answer. Nor can a prosecutor having to bear this burden of 
proof, especially when unanimity is required and compromise is possi-
ble, be assured the "right" verdict. 
In a world of such uncertainty, is it necessarily bad for defendants 
and prosecutors to make an effort to agree outside of the trial process 
on the just result? If each side believes that uncertainty has been fairly 
resolved, and if both have attempted to recognize the risks of present-
ing any reconstruction of facts to a jury, is the notion of compromise 
worse than the risk of forcing a jury decision? These are not rhetorical 
questions. Plea bargaining is disagreeable for many reasons. But In-
side the Jury indicates that the difference among verdicts to be ex-
pected from juries is also cause for concern. No one would propose, I 
suspect, that we deny jury trials to defendants who want them, but 
Inside the Jury might support an argument that those defendants who 
fear jury error more than prosecutorial overreaching in bargaining 
ought to be permitted, even encouraged, to attempt to reach a fair 
disposition with the prosecutor short of trial. 
The final lesson is one of the most important from my perspective. 
Years ago, I expressed concern about the tendency of courts to find 
errors harmless in criminal cases, especially nonconstitutional errors.38 
The videotaped trial described in Inside the Jury appears to be a classic 
case in which a trial judge erred, and in which the error might have 
had more impact on the jury's deliberations than an appellate court 
ever would concede. 
The trial judge erred, I believe, in excluding evidence of the vie-
38. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973). 
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tim's reputation for violence. In most jurisdictions, the victim's repu-
tation for violence is admissible to support a claim of self-defense. 39 
At the time the trial judge ruled in the videotape, Massachusetts 
courts might well have limited reputation evidence to that known to 
the defendant.40 The trial judge excluded the evidence completely, 
even though it appears that the defendant and the deceased were from 
the same neighborhood, that reputations there were generally known, 
and that the defendant knew the reputation of the deceased.41 Had the 
evidence been admitted, the jury would have been able to consider not 
only the single altercation during the afternoon, but also the de-
ceased's apparent violent personality. This would have provided 
strong support for the defendant's claim that he acted reasonably in 
defending himself. 42 
It is not hard to imagine an appellate court dismissing any error as 
harmless, however. The court might say that the jury heard about the 
victim's violent behavior in the afternoon and that reputation evidence 
was unnecessary to show the violent, or at least bellicose, nature of the 
deceased. Inside the Jury demonstrates that jurors try to follow the 
judge's instructions on character evidence (p. 155). Thus, a diligent 
jury would have paid no attention to the defense's attempt to show 
that the deceased's violent character made it likely that he initiated a 
violent attack and that the deceased's reputation made the defendant's 
response reasonable. 
When the exclusion of this evidence is considered together with the 
failure to give an instruction that a jury can consider a defendant's 
character and that character evidence alone may create a reasonable 
doubt, the verdicts of second degree murder become more understand-
able. Why was there no affirmative instruction on behalf of the de-
fendant? Perhaps there was none in the real trial. Or perhaps defense 
counsel on the tape neglected to ask for one. It is not unreasonable to 
observe that a jury asked to believe self-defense might have been influ-
enced by more proof regarding the deceased and an instruction on the 
possible significance of the defendant's own reputation. 
39. See R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE 238 & n.88 
(2d ed. 1982). A typical rule is FED. R. Evm. 4-04(a)(l). 
4-0. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 368 Mass. 518, 333 N.E.2d 400 (1975); Commonwealth 
v. Tircinski, 189 Mass. 257, 75 N.E. 261 (1905). 
41. The defendant did not testify that he knew the deceased's reputation, but it seems likely 
that his lawyer by that time had given up the point after repeatedly failing to get the evidence 
admitted. 
42. A related ruling was the refusal to permit the owner-bartender to testify to the defen-
dant's good reputation. While at some point the character evidence would have become cumula-
tive and not very valuable, in this case the character evidence was the most important evidence 
supporting the defendant's self-defense theory. Testimony by the owner-bartender might have 
been especially significant on the theory that the jury might have been impressed that even in the 
bar the defendant was known to be peaceable. Yet, this is the kind of ruling that is unlikely ever 
to be disturbed on appeal. 
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Again the problem of uncertainty raises its head. The Supreme 
Court is wont to say that trials are often not perfect, and apparently no 
effort need be made to make them as perfect as can be.43 As a result, 
the difference between verdicts in real cases based on similar facts, 
although not between verdicts in this study, may well be traceable to 
the difference in a ruling on an evidence point. Once again, one may 
wonder whether the defendant who seeks to plead and achieve cer-
tainty is poorly treated vis-a-vis the defendant who chooses trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Inside the Jury is a wonderful addition to the literature on juries. 
It probably is the most important study since Kalven and Zeise! did 
The American Jury almost two decades ago. By using real jurors, the 
authors have overcome the defects apparent in many less ambitious 
efforts using college students as subjects. Through videotape and 
scrupulous analysis of deliberations, Inside the Jury tells lawyers, 
judges, lawmakers and social scientists interested in the behavior of 
groups generally and juries particularly more than they ever knew 
about jury behavior. 
With all of its strengths, Inside the Jury is not a perfect study. Its· 
flaws are real and should not be denied simply because the study is so 
evidently significant and its effort so worthy of praise. Inside the Jury 
will surely inform for years to come debates about trials, trial strategy, 
and the role of judges in supervising juries. And if it is used properly, 
it will pave the way for further work on juries. Surely its authors 
would welcome this. If, however, more is claimed for Inside the Jury 
than is warranted, the additional work that should be done might be 
delayed. That would be too bad, because Inside the Jury has identified 
the questions that most need to be answered. 
43. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973). 
